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ABSTRACT 
 
The conventional Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) which is popularly used 
for prioritizing risk of failure modes of industrial products has limitations such as the 
inability of the technique to utilize imprecise ratings from experts. These limitations 
impact negatively on its effectiveness in prioritizing risk. This paper presents a 
technique that integrates Averaging technique with Multi Attribute Utility Theory 
method for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. The objective is to develop an 
alternative tool that avoids the limitations of the conventional FMEA such that risk of 
failure mode is prioritized more efficiently. The suitability of the proposed approach is 
demonstrated with a case study of the rotor blades of an aircraft turbine. The results 
show that the proposed approach is more flexible and effective for practical application 
than the conventional FMEA.   
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Failure Mode Effect and Analysis (FMEA) is one of the most powerful tools for 
evaluating risk of industrial products such as aircraft engines and ship systems (Pillay & 
Wang, 2003; Emovon et al., 2014). In such systems, failure occurs in diverse ways and 
the associated risks and consequences differ. In order to reduce or eliminate failure and 
associated consequences of these systems, the FMEA offers a useful way to prioritize 
failure modes. The approach was first developed by NASA in the 1960s as a tool to 
eliminate or reduce complex system failures in the aviation industry in order for the 
system to attain high levels of safety and availability (Du, Mo, Deng, Sadiq & Deng, 
2014). The conventional FMEA uses Risk Priority Number (RPN) in prioritizing risk of 
failure modes and is a product of the probability of Occurrence of failure (O), resulting 
degree of Severity (S) and the ability to Detect (D) the failure before it occurs, and it is 
expressed as Equation (1): 
 
RPN = OSD                                                                                                                    (1)                                                                                       
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The ordinal scales shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 are used by experts in assigning values to 
O, S and D respectively. FMEA application has subsequently been extended to other 
industries apart from the aviation industry where it originated. For example, Zhou and 
Shi (2010) presented the application of FMEA for assessment of risk of different 
equipment items of a large crane vessel’s power system. In performing Reliability 
Centered Maintenance for marine systems, the American Bureau of Shipping (2003) 
requires FMEA to be employed for determining functions and failures of the systems. 
Cicek, Turan, Topcu and Searslan (2010) applied FMEA in prioritizing the risk of 
failure modes of the fuel system of a marine diesel engine. The authors identified 10 
failure modes which were ranked using RPN of the FMEA. Cicek and Celik (2013) 
extended the application of the conventional FMEA to prioritizing the risk of main 
engine crankcase explosion failures on-board ship. However, despite the wide 
acceptance of the FMEA in the aviation, marine and other industries, various limitations 
have affected its effectiveness in prioritizing risk of failure modes of complex industrial 
products. Some of these limitations are:  
 
i. Inability of the FMEA to aggregate multiple experts’ risk ratings that may be 
imprecise in practical application (Yang, Huang, He, Zhu & Wen, 2011; Su, 
Deng, Mahadevan & Bao, 2012).  
ii. Inability of the technique to utilize more than three risk criteria in prioritizing risk 
of failure modes, thereby excluding other important criteria such as economic cost 
and environmental impact (Braglia, 2000, Sachdeva, Kumar & Kumar, 2009, 
Zammori and Gabbrielli, 2012, Liu et al., 2011). 
iii. Different combinations of O, S and D producing same RPN value whereas the risk 
might be totally different (Sachdeva et al., 2009, Kutlu & Ekmekçioǧlu, 2012, 
Liu, Liu, Liu & Mao, 2012, Sharma & Sharma, 2012).    
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a systematic approach for prioritizing risk of 
failure modes that avoids the above limitations of the conventional FMEA. In order to 
achieve this objective, a novel approach which combines averaging technique with 
Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) method is proposed. The averaging technique is 
designed specifically to aggregate imprecise information from experts and the result is 
then used as input data into the MAUT methodology in the ranking of the failure 
modes. The applicability of the integrated Averaging technique and MAUT method is 
illustrated with a case study of the rotor blades of an aircraft turbine.  
 
Table 1. Ratings for occurrence (O)  
(Yang et al., 2011, Pillay & Wang, 2003, Cicek & Celik, 2013) 
Rating Probability of occurrence Possible failure rate 
10 Very high (failure is almost unavoidable) > 1/2 
9 
 
1/3 
8 High (repeated failures) 1/8 
7 
 
1/20 
6 Moderate (occasional failures) 1/80 
5 
 
1/400 
4 
 
1/2000 
3 Low (relatively few failures) 1/15000 
2 
 
1/150000 
1 Remote (failure almost impossible) < 1/1500000 
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Table 2. Ratings for severity (S)  
(Yang et al., 2011, Pillay and Wang, 2003, Cicek and Celik, 2013) 
 
Rating Effect Severity of effect 
10 Hazardous 
without warning 
Mechanical system failure resulting in hazardous effects 
almost certain 
9 Hazardous with 
warning 
Mechanical system failure resulting in hazardous effects 
highly probable 
8 Very high Mechanical system inoperable but safe 
7 High Mechanical system performance severely affected 
6 Moderate Mechanical system operable and safe but performance 
degraded 
5 Low Reduced system performance with gradual performance 
degradation 
4 Very low Minor effect on mechanical system performance 
3 Minor Mechanical system performance affected slightly.  
2 Very minor Negligible effect on mechanical system performance 
1 None No effect 
 
 
Table 3. Ratings for Detectability (D)  
(Yang et al., 2011, Pillay & Wang, 2003, Cicek & Celik, 2013) 
 
Rating Detection Criteria 
10 Absolutely 
impossible 
System control (detection system) cannot detect a 
potential cause and subsequent failure mode or there is no 
system control 
9 Very remote Very remote chance the system control will detect a 
potential failure cause and consequent failure mode 
8 Remote Remote chance the system control will detect a potential 
failure cause and consequent failure mode 
7 Very low Very low chance the system control will detect a potential 
failure cause and consequent failure mode 
6 Low Low chance the system control will detect a potential 
failure cause and consequent failure mode 
5 Moderate Moderate chance the system control will detect a potential 
failure cause and consequent failure mode 
4 Moderately high Moderately high chance the system control will detect a 
potential failure cause and consequent failure mode 
3 High High chance the system control will detect a potential 
failure cause and consequent failure mode 
2 Very high Very high chance the system control will detect a potential 
failure cause and consequent failure mode 
1 Almost certain  System control will almost certainly detect a potential 
failure cause and consequent failure mode 
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2.0 METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Averaging Technique  
 
In most practical cases information obtainable from experts is imprecise, which the 
conventional FMEA is incapable of handling. The averaging technique is principally 
designed for aggregating imprecise values of individual experts’ criteria ratings (O, S 
and D) such that the imprecisions are captured as an expectation interval (Emovon et al., 
2014). The maximum and minimum bounds of the expectation interval are then 
averaged and used as input into MAUT methodology or any other ranking tool the 
decision maker deems appropriate to evaluate the risk of each failure mode.  The 
methodological steps of the averaging technique are as follows (Emovon et al., 2014): 
 
STEP 1: Formation of decision problem  
 
Ratings for each failure modes based on decision criteria are obtained from experts and 
then used to form a decision matrix of alternatives, j, with respect to criteria, i. An 
example of such a decision matrix with elements xij is presented in Table 4. The 
elements xij   may be precise or imprecise (Chin, Wang, Ka Kwai Poon & Yang, 2009a). 
A rating with single confidence of 100% is referred to as a precise rating. For example, 
if an expert assigned 5 to a particular failure mode, this can be written as 5:100%. A 
rating with multiple confidences summing to 100% is known as a complete distribution 
rating. For example, if an expert assigned 5 at 80% confidence and 7 at 20% confidence, 
the confidence 80% and 20% sum to 100%.  
 
A rating with confidence not summing to 100% is referred to as incomplete or 
imprecise distribution. For example, if an expert assigned 7 at 30% confidence and 
assigned 8 at 60% confidence to a failure mode, there is 10% confidence missing. The 
10% confidence missing is generally termed local ignorance and could be assigned to 
any rating between 1 and 10 (Shafer, 1976).   
 
Table 4. Decision matrix (problem) 
 
Failure modes (Aj) Decision criteria (Ri) 
O S D 
A1 x11 x12 x13 
A2 x21 x22 x23 
A3 x31 x32 x33 
… … … … 
Am xm1 xm2 xm3 
 
STEP 2:    Minimum and maximum risk criteria values computation 
 
The imprecise rating can be denoted as an expectation interval whose minimum and 
maximum risk values are as expressed in Equations (2) and (3) (Chin, Wang, Poon, & 
Yang, , 2009b):  
    
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑥ij = 𝑥ij
1. 𝑧ij
1 + 𝑥ij
2. 𝑧ij
2 +  [1. (100% − 𝑧ij
1 − 𝑧ij
2)]            (2) 
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𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑥ij = 𝑥ij
1. 𝑧ij
1 + 𝑥ij
2. 𝑧ij
2 +  [10. (100% − 𝑧ij
1 − 𝑧ij
2)]                                                   (3) 
 
where  𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑥ij  is the minimum risk value  
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑥ij is the maximum risk value  
𝑥ij
1  and  𝑥ij
2  are the imprecise rating of failure mode j with respect to risk 
criterion i assigned by an expert at percentage confidence  𝑧ij
1 and 
𝑧ij
2 respectively. 
 
STEP 3:     Computation of the mean risk value  
 
The minimum and maximum risk values are averaged to obtain the mean risk value of 
failure mode j with respect to risk criterion i as expressed in Equation (4): 
 
𝑥ij =
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑥ij + 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑥ij
2
                                                                                                            (4) 
 
The next step is to use the values of 𝑥ij to form a decision matrix shown in Table 5 and 
then evaluate it with the MAUT method.  
 
 
2.2    MAUT Method 
 
When decision makers are faced with making a decision involving multiple criteria, the 
MAUT method is one of the Multiple-criteria decision-making MCDM tools utilized in 
reaching an optimum solution. One of the important features of the technique is the 
ability of the decision maker to incorporate its risk perception into the decision-making 
process, which is lacking in other MCDM tools. However, in practical cases, a large 
amount of data may be required to accurately estimate the risk preference of the 
decision maker for each decision criterion and the evaluation process might be quite 
difficult, and to ease the process several assumptions are made. MAUT technique 
development can be traced to the utility theory developed by Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1947) and the elicitation and specific assessment techniques developed by Keeney and 
Raiffa (1976). The MAUT method has been used in the literature in addressing 
decision-making problems involving multiple criteria. De Almeida and Bohoris (1996) 
used the methodology in selecting optimum maintenance strategy. Brito and de Almeida 
(2009) applied the MAUT technique to prioritize the risk of leakage in a natural gas 
pipeline. Having been applied successfully in solving other multi-criteria problems, the 
method is combined in this paper with the averaging technique in prioritizing risk of 
failure modes.  
 
The methodological procedures of the MAUT technique are as follows: 
 
STEP 1: Risk mean values decision matrix formation 
 
The data obtained from Equation (4) is use to form a decision matrix as follows: 
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Table 5. Risk mean values decision matrix 
 
Failure modes (Aj) Decision criteria (Ri) 
O S D 
A1 𝑥11 𝑥12 𝑥13 
A2 𝑥21 𝑥22 𝑥23 
A3 𝑥31 𝑥32 𝑥33 
… … … … 
Am 𝑥𝑚1 𝑥𝑚2 𝑥𝑚3 
 
STEP 2: Single utility functions determination 
 
The risk preference of the decision maker is incorporated into the risk prioritization 
process with the utility function. The decision maker’s risk perceptions are of three 
categories risk prone, risk neutral and risk averse. The power series function is a popular 
utility function used in defining risk criteria and is presented as in Equation (5) (Anders 
and Vaccaro, 2011): 
 
𝑢(𝑅i) =
(𝑅i − 𝑎)
𝑌
(𝑏 − 𝑎)𝑌
                                                                                                                      (5) 
 
where the risk perception of the decision maker is denoted by Y.  
 
The value of 1 is assigned when the decision maker is risk neutral. For risk-prone and 
risk-averse decision makers Y is assigned value greater and less than 1 respectively. The 
maximum and minimum values of the element of risk criteria Ri are a and b respectively 
in Equation (5). Considering Equation (5), the utility values of the elements of risk 
criteria O, S and D are evaluated with Equations (6) to (8) respectively: 
 
𝑢(𝑂) =  
(𝑥1j − 𝑎1)
𝑌
(𝑏1 − 𝑎1)𝑌
                                                                                                                   (6) 
 
 
𝑢(𝑆) =   
(𝑥2j − 𝑎2)
𝑌
(𝑏2 − 𝑎2)𝑌
                                                                                                                  (7) 
 
 
𝑢(𝐷) =   
(𝑥3j − 𝑎3)
𝑌
(𝑏3 − 𝑎3)𝑌
                                                                                                                 (8) 
 
The maximum and minimum values of the elements that belong to risk criterion O are 
represented as constants a1, b1. Constants a2, b2 represent the maximum and minimum 
values of elements of decision criterion S. Finally, 𝑏3, 𝑎3 denote the maximum and 
minimum values of the elements in the decision matrix that belong to the decision D. 
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STEP 3: Multi-attribute utility functions determination 
 
The three decision criteria utility functions u(O), u(S) and u(D) and their respective 
weights are combined to form a single analytical model as in Equation (9):  
 
𝑈(𝑂, 𝑆, 𝐷) = 𝑤𝑜𝑢(𝑂) +   𝑤𝑠𝑢(𝑆) +    𝑤𝐷𝑢(𝐷)                                                                   (9) 
 
where 𝑤𝑜 , 𝑤𝑠 and 𝑤𝐷 are the weights of O, S and D respectively. 
 
 
3.0    RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
To demonstrate the suitability and the potential benefits of the proposed technique, a 
case study is conducted that examines the rotor blades for an aircraft turbine. The 
example is adapted from the work of Zhong (2003). Nine failure modes are identified 
for the turbo rotor blades of the aircraft turbine. For the compressor rotor blades, eight 
failure modes are identified with varying causes of failure. All together a total of 17 
failure modes are identified. The 17 failure modes together with associated causes, 
effects and failure detection system are presented in Table 6. The failure modes were 
ranked by three experts using an ordinal scale and considering three risk criteria, O, S 
and D. Their ratings are presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 6. FMEA for the rotor blades of an aircraft turbine (Zhong, 2003) 
 
S/N Equipment 
items 
Failure 
mode 
Causes of failure Effect of 
failure 
Detection 
system 
1 Compressor 
rotor blades 
Deformation  Low yield strength due 
to improper material 
treatment, high 
centrifugal stress due 
to engine over speed  
Blade 
replacement 
Yes 
2 Compressor 
rotor blades 
Crack Improper material Blade 
replacement 
Yes 
3 Compressor 
rotor blades 
Fracture Corrosion, crack, high 
local stress 
Engine 
damage, 
endangered 
flight safety 
No 
4 Compressor 
rotor blades 
Corrosion Imperfect blade 
surface 
Blade 
replacement 
Yes 
5 Compressor 
rotor blades 
Blade tip 
wear 
Vertical low-
frequency centrifugal 
load 
Blade and 
engine casing 
replacement 
Yes 
6 Compressor 
rotor blades 
Deflection Low blade strength 
due to over-
temperature 
Blade 
replacement 
Yes 
7 Compressor 
rotor blades 
 
 
Guideway 
crack 
Improper material Blade 
replacement 
No 
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8 Compressor 
rotor blades 
Injured by 
foreign 
objects 
Foreign objects of 
inhalation of inlet 
channel 
Blade 
replacement 
No 
9 Turbo rotor 
blades 
High-cycle 
intrigue 
fracture 
Torsional resonance 
caused by design and 
technology factors 
Broke the 
engine, 
endangered 
flight safety 
No 
10 Turbo rotor 
blades 
Low-cycle 
intrigue 
fracture 
Low yield strength due 
to improper material 
treatment 
Engine 
damage, 
endangered 
flight safety 
No 
11 Turbo rotor 
blades 
Intergranular 
fracture 
Blade over-heating Engine 
damage, 
endangered 
flight safety 
No 
12 Turbo rotor 
blades 
Creep-
fatigue 
fracture 
Recrystallization of 
local part of blades 
Engine 
damage, 
endangered 
flight safety 
No 
13 Turbo rotor 
blades 
Fatigue-
creep 
fracture 
Surface coating 
desquamated due to 
thermal stress 
Blade 
replacement 
No 
14 Turbo rotor 
blades 
Fracture as a 
result of a 
combination 
of high-
cycle and 
low-cycle 
fatigue crack 
Large gap of blade 
crown and high 
vibration stress 
Engine 
damage, 
endangered 
flight safety 
No 
15 Turbo rotor 
blades 
Crack High thermal stress Blade 
replacement 
Yes 
16 Turbo rotor 
blades 
Corrosion Loss of corrosion-
resistant materials 
Blade 
replacement 
Yes 
17 Turbo rotor 
blades 
Deformation  Low blade strength 
due to over-
temperature 
Blade 
replacement 
Yes 
 
 
In applying the integrated averaging technique and MAUT method, the first step in 
addressing the problem in Table 7 is to aggregate the imprecise rating using the 
averaging technique. The averaging technique was performed firstly by using individual 
expert imprecise ratings in Table 7 as input into Equations (2) and (3) to obtain 
individual expert minimum and maximum ratings of failure modes. The minimum and 
maximum ratings were then averaged using Equation 4 to obtained mean ratings of 
failure modes, which were used to form the decision matrix shown in Table 8. 
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Table 7. Three experts’ failure mode ratings, adapted from Yang et al. (2011) 
 
Failure 
modes 
Rating of risk factor 
 Expert 1     Expert 2     Expert 3   
 O S D 
 
O S D 
 
O S D 
1  3:40% 7 2   3:90% 7 2   3:80% 7 2 
 
 4:60% 
   
4:10% 
   
4:20% 
  2  2 8 4 
 
2 8:70% 4 
 
2 8 4 
 
 
     
9:30% 
     3  1 10 3 
 
1 10 3 
 
1 10 3 
4  1 6:80% 3 
 
1 6 3:70% 
 
1 6 3 
 
 
 
7:20% 
    
2:30% 
    5  1 3 2:50% 
 
1 3 1:70% 
 
1 3:60% 1 
 
 
  
1:50% 
   
2:30% 
  
2:40% 
 6  2 6 5 
 
2 6 5 
 
2 6 5 
7  1 7 3 
 
1 7 3 
 
1 7 3 
8  3 5:60% 1 
 
3 5:80% 1 
 
3 5:80% 1 
 
 
 
6:40% 
   
6:20% 
   
7:20% 
 9  2:90% 10:60% 4 
 
2:75% 10:90% 4 
 
2:80% 10:90% 4 
 
 1:10% 9:40% 
  
1:25% 9:10% 
  
1:20% 9:10% 
 10  1 10 6 
 
1 10 6 
 
1 10 6 
11  1 10 5 
 
1 10 5 
 
1 10 5 
12  1 10 6:60% 
 
1 10 5:80% 
 
1 10 6:70% 
 
 
  
5:40% 
   
4:20% 
   
5:30% 
13  1 10 5:80% 
 
1 10 5 
 
1 10 5 
 
 
  
4:20% 
        14  1 10 6 
 
1 10 6:80% 
 
1 10 6 
 
 
      
7:20% 
    15  2 7:95% 3 
 
2 7 3 
 
2 7 3:70% 
 
 
 
6:5% 
        
4:30% 
16  2:90% 4 3 
 
2:75% 4 3 
 
2:80% 4 3:80% 
 
 1:10% 
   
1:25% 
   
1:20% 
 
2:20% 
17  2 5:90% 3 
 
2 5:90% 3 
 
2 5:60% 3 
     6:10%       6:10%       6:40%   
 
 
The next step is to apply the MAUT method in evaluating the decision matrix in Table 8 
in order to obtain the rank for the 17 failure modes. Three scenarios were studied, the 
first being when the decision makers are assumed to be risk neutral, the second scenario 
when they are assumed to be risk prone, and the last scenario when they are assumed to 
be risk averse.  
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Table 8. Decision matrix 
 
Failure 
modes 
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 
O S D O S D O S D 
1 3.6 7 2 3.1 7 2 3.2 7 2 
2 2 8 4 4 8.3 4 2 8 4 
3 1 10 3 1 10 3 1 10 3 
4 1 6.2 3 1 6 2.7 1 6 3 
5 1 3 1.5 1 3 1.3 1 2.6 1 
6 2 6 5 2 6 5 2 6 5 
7 1 7 3 1 7 3 1 7 3 
8 3 5.4 1 3 5.2 1 3 5.4 1 
9 1.9 9.6 4 1.8 9.6 4 1.8 9.9 4 
10 1 10 6 1 10 6 1 10 6 
11 1 10 5 1 10 5 1 10 5 
12 1 10 5.6 1 10 4.8 1 10 5.7 
13 1 10 4.8 1 10 5 1 10 5 
14 1 10 6 1 10 6.2 1 10 6 
15 2 7 3 2 7 3 2 7 3.3 
16 1.9 4 3 1.8 4 3 1.8 4 2.8 
17 2 5.1 3 2 5.1 3 2 5.4 3 
 
 
 
The decision makers are three experts who rated failure modes with respect to risk 
criteria. In applying the MAUT method, the first step was to evaluate the utility function 
values of elements of criteria O, S and D by applying Equations (6) to (8) respectively 
to the individual experts’ mean ratings of failure modes in Table 8. The utility function 
values of the three risk criteria O, S and D together with decision criteria weights are 
aggregated using Equation (9) to obtain MAUT utility values for each failure mode. The 
MAUT utility values (multi-attribute utility functions values) and corresponding 
rankings obtained for the 17 failure modes in the three scenarios – risk neutral (Y=1), 
risk prone (Y=2) and risk averse (Y=0.5) – are presented in Tables 9 to 11. 
 
From Tables 9 to 11, columns 2 to 4 represent the MAUT utility values obtained for the 
17 failure modes using data from experts 1 to 3 as input into the MAUT methodology 
whilst their corresponding rankings are presented in columns 6 to 8. The overall ranking 
of the failure modes is the mean values in column 5, which are the averages of experts 
1 to 3’s MAUT utility values in columns 2 to 4 and the corresponding ranking presented 
in column 9. 
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Table 9. MAUT overall ranking of failure modes (Y=1) 
 
Failure 
modes 
MAUT utility values Ranking 
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Mean Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Mean 
1 0.6714 0.5345 0.6784 0.6281 1 5 1 2 
2 0.5374 0.8214 0.5735 0.6441 5 1 3 1 
3 0.4000 0.3962 0.4000 0.3987 12 11 13 12 
4 0.2371 0.2103 0.2378 0.2284 16 16 16 16 
5 0.0250 0.0144 0.0000 0.0131 17 17 17 17 
6 0.5016 0.4709 0.5424 0.5050 7 9 6 7 
7 0.2714 0.2676 0.2784 0.2725 15 14 15 15 
8 0.4490 0.3943 0.5226 0.4553 10 12 8 10 
9 0.5886 0.5471 0.6096 0.5818 2 3 2 3 
10 0.5500 0.5404 0.5500 0.5468 3 4 4 5 
11 0.5000 0.4923 0.5000 0.4974 8 6 9 8 
12 0.5300 0.4827 0.5350 0.5159 6 8 7 6 
13 0.4900 0.4923 0.5000 0.4941 9 6 9 9 
14 0.5500 0.5500 0.5500 0.5500 3 2 4 4 
15 0.4445 0.4176 0.4979 0.4533 11 10 11 11 
16 0.2986 0.2590 0.3104 0.2893 14 15 14 14 
17 0.3631 0.3362 0.4181 0.3725 13 13 12 13 
 
 
Table 10. MAUT overall ranking of failure modes (Y=2) 
 
Failure 
modes 
MAUT utility values Ranking 
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Mean Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Mean 
1 0.5580 0.3277 0.5661 0.4839 1 9 1 4 
2 0.3096 0.7052 0.3427 0.4525 9 1 9 6 
3 0.3400 0.3370 0.3400 0.3390 8 8 10 9 
4 0.1027 0.0818 0.1033 0.0959 15 15 15 15 
5 0.0025 0.0008 0.0000 0.0011 17 17 17 17 
6 0.2817 0.2530 0.3163 0.2837 11 10 11 11 
7 0.1380 0.1349 0.1461 0.1397 13 13 14 14 
8 0.3015 0.2296 0.4149 0.3153 10 11 8 10 
9 0.4106 0.3819 0.4415 0.4113 7 7 7 8 
10 0.5500 0.5311 0.5500 0.5437 2 3 2 2 
11 0.4600 0.4479 0.4600 0.4560 5 4 5 5 
12 0.5116 0.4335 0.5209 0.4887 4 6 4 3 
13 0.4444 0.4479 0.4600 0.4508 6 4 5 7 
14 0.5500 0.5500 0.5500 0.5500 2 2 2 1 
15 0.2045 0.1849 0.2519 0.2138 12 12 12 12 
16 0.1000 0.0751 0.1026 0.0926 16 16 16 16 
17 0.1336 0.1140 0.1759 0.1412 14 14 13 13 
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Table 11. MAUT overall ranking of failure modes (Y=0.5) 
 
Failure 
modes 
MAUT utility values Ranking 
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Mean Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Mean 
1 0.7886 0.7129 0.7931 0.7649 1 3 1 2 
2 0.7263 0.9009 0.7533 0.7935 3 1 3 1 
3 0.4581 0.4550 0.4581 0.4571 14 14 14 14 
4 0.3610 0.3393 0.3615 0.3539 16 16 16 16 
5 0.0791 0.0600 0.0000 0.0464 17 17 17 17 
6 0.6991 0.6755 0.7303 0.7016 4 4 4 4 
7 0.3849 0.3818 0.3894 0.3854 15 15 15 15 
8 0.5703 0.5356 0.6136 0.5732 7 9 7 7 
9 0.7497 0.7136 0.7630 0.7421 2 2 2 3 
10 0.5500 0.5451 0.5500 0.5484 8 8 9 9 
11 0.5236 0.5193 0.5236 0.5222 12 10 12 12 
12 0.5398 0.5137 0.5424 0.5320 10 12 11 10 
13 0.5179 0.5193 0.5236 0.5203 13 10 12 13 
14 0.5500 0.5500 0.5500 0.5500 8 7 9 8 
15 0.6640 0.6416 0.7043 0.6700 5 5 5 5 
16 0.5363 0.5008 0.5518 0.5296 11 13 8 11 
17 0.6015 0.5792 0.6460 0.6089 6 6 6 6 
 
 
 
In Table 9, where the decision makers are assumed to be risk neutral, the failure mode  
2 is ranked first, having the highest MAUT utility value of 0.6441. This is followed by 
failure mode 1, occupying the second position. The lowest rank is for failure mode 5, 
which has the lowest MAUT utility value of 0.0131. In Table 10, where decision 
makers are assumed to be risk prone, failure mode 14 is ranked first, having the highest 
MAUT utility value of 0.5500. This is followed by failure mode 10, occupying the 
second position with a MAUT utility value of 0.5437. Failure mode 5 is occupying the 
last position, having the lowest MAUT utility value. In Table 11, where decision 
makers are assumed to be risk averse, the first position is occupied by failure mode 2, 
having the highest MAUT utility value of 0.7935, while the lowest ranked is failure 
mode 5, with the lowest MAUT utility value of 0.0464.  
 
It is obvious from the results that the risk perception of the decision makers is a strong 
factor in the risk prioritization process, as the result produced from risk-prone decision 
makers differs significantly from that of risk-neutral and risk-averse decision makers. 
However, there is no significant difference between rankings of failure modes obtained 
by the MAUT method when decision makers are risk prone and risk neutral, as all the 
17 failure modes are ranked almost completely the same. 
 
The proposed method is compared with the results obtained from the conventional 
FMEA (RPN) to see the similarity between the two methods. Ordinarily, the RPN 
methodology is incapable of utilizing imprecise information from experts; as a result, 
the aggregated imprecise ratings from experts using the averaging technique is used as 
input into the RPN and the results obtained are presented in Table 12. 
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Table 12. RPN ranking of failure modes 
 
Failure 
modes 
RPN values Ranks 
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Mean Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Mean 
1 50.40 43.40 44.80 46.20 7 9 10 9 
2 64.00 132.80 64.00 86.93 2 1 2 1 
3 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 12 12 12 12 
4 18.60 16.20 18.00 17.60 15 15 15 15 
5 4.50 3.90 2.600 3.67 17 17 17 17 
6 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 3 4 3 4 
7 21.00 21.00 21.00 21.00 14 14 13 14 
8 16.20 15.60 16.20 16.00 16 16 16 16 
9 72.96 69.12 71.28 71.12 1 2 1 2 
10 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 3 4 3 4 
11 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 8 6 7 7 
12 56.00 48.00 57.00 53.67 6 8 6 6 
13 48.00 50.00 50.00 49.33 9 6 7 8 
14 60.00 62.00 60.00 60.67 3 3 3 3 
15 42.00 42.00 46.20 43.40 10 10 9 10 
16 22.80 21.60 20.16 21.52 13 13 14 13 
17 30.60 30.60 32.40 31.20 11 11 11 11 
 
 
Firstly, the results obtained from the MAUT method when decision makers are assumed 
to be risk neutral (Table 9, column 9) are compared with the results obtained from the 
conventional FMEA (Table 12 column 9). Failure mode 2 was ranked number 1 by the 
two methods in this scenario and as such is the most significant failure mode among the 
17 failure modes. The failure mode that was ranked as the worst one by the two 
techniques is failure mode 5, occupying position 17 among the 17 failure modes. This 
shows that there is similarity in the results produced by the two methods, and as such 
validated the proposed technique. However, looking at the results generated by the 
MAUT method (Table 10, column 9) when the decision makers are assumed to be risk 
prone when compared with the output of RPN (Table 9, column 9), there appears to be a 
significant difference between them. For example, in the MAUT method, failure mode 
14 is ranked number 1 while, in the RPN method, failure mode 2 is ranked number 1; 
failure mode 1 is ranked number 4 by the MAUT method and failure mode 1 is ranked 
number 9 by the RPN method. 
 
 
4.0 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has proposed a systematic approach that combines the averaging technique 
with the MAUT method. The averaging technique is used in aggregating imprecise 
information from experts while the MAUT technique is applied in the ranking of failure 
modes. One of the unique features of the proposed method is the incorporation of the 
risk perception of the decision makers into the risk prioritization process, which is 
lacking in the conventional FMEA. Other important features of the proposed approach 
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that are deficient in the conventional FMEA are: (1) the ability to incorporate more than 
three decision criteria and (2) the ability to utilize imprecise rating from experts. A case 
study of an aircraft turbine rotor blade was used to demonstrate the suitability of the 
proposed technique. The results revealed that decision makers risk perception impact 
significantly in the decision-making process and that the proposed method is capable of 
solving the risk prioritization problem effectively whilst avoiding the limitations of the 
conventional FMEA. Although the method was applied in this paper in solving the risk 
prioritization problem of an aircraft turbine rotor blade, the technique is capable of 
addressing other machinery FMEA problems. 
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